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Abstract  
Purpose. Unexpected questions have been shown to increase cues to 
deception, without reducing the information given by truth tellers. Two studies 
investigated whether asking expected versus unexpected questions first impacted on 
the amount of detail provided by interviewees. 
Methodology. In Study 1, participants (N = 85) were interviewed about their 
own intentions and in Study 2, participants (N = 84) were interviewed about an 
intention given to them by the experimenter.  
Results. Analyses showed that, in both studies, differences between the 
expected-first and the unexpected-first order were minimal and lie detection accuracy 
was not improved by asking the unexpected questions first. Unlike in previous 
research, differences between truth tellers and liars were not larger for unexpected 
questions than expected questions. 
Conclusions. These results offer important information for forensic 
interviewers, showing that there is no need to ask unexpected questions at a specific 
point during the interviews.  Link to associated OSF page: 
https://osf.io/93g7h/?view_only=680db3652bff44cfaa1b6534eb04688e (anonymised 
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Unexpected questions in deception detection interviews: does question order 
matter? 
 
Interviews in forensic settings can have two goals: to obtain information from 
the interviewee and to determine whether the interviewee is lying or telling the truth 
(Fisher, 1995; Vrij, Mann, Kristen and Fisher, 2007; Nahari et al., 2019, commentary 
1). How much information is obtained is often not measured in the amount of words 
used by an interviewee, but in the amount of details provided. Several schemes have 
been developed to code for the amount of details provided by an interviewee. Reality 
Monitoring (RM) is one commonly used scheme (e.g. Nahari & Vrij, 2013), which 
uses several criteria to measure the richness of detail provided by interviewees.  
Different interview techniques have been developed to increase the amount of 
details obtained from an interviewee, which benefits both aims of the interview: to 
obtain information and detect deception. Asking unexpected questions is one such 
technique. It is based on the cognitive load theory of deception, which states that 
lying is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth and that increasing the 
cognitive load for interviewees should increase the number of deception cues (Vrij, 
Fisher, Mann, & Leal, S., 2006; Vrij, Fisher &  Blank, 2017). Both truthful and 
deceptive interviewees provide less details in response to unexpected questions than 
to expected questions, a sign that answering unexpected questions is harder. The 
reduction in detail for unexpected questions is larger for liars than truth tellers 
(Lancaster, Vrij, Hope and Waller, 2012). Liars may answer unexpected questions in 
less detail than truth tellers because liars rely on answers that they have prepared 
beforehand. For unexpected questions, liars have no answer prepared, therefore they 
have to create one, which increases difficulty. Truth tellers also find it harder to 
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answer unexpected questions, but they can rely on their memory. Retrieving a 
memory is likely to be easier than creating an answer (Clemens, Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2013, Vrij et al., 2009).  
There is evidence that the unexpected questions technique can be effective in 
interviews about intentions as well as those about past events (Warmelink, Vrij, 
Mann, Jundi and Granhag, 2012), unlike other techniques derived from the cognitive 
load technique (e.g. Fenn, McGuire, Langleben and Blandón-Gitlin, 2015). In 
interviews about intentions, liars give more detail than truth tellers in response to 
expected questions, but less detail in response to unexpected questions (Warmelink et 
al. 2012). This is a slightly different pattern than ‘liars give less detail than truth 
tellers’ found in interviews about other topics (DePaulo et al. 2003). Warmelink et al. 
(2012) speculated that this difference is caused by lying participants ‘over-preparing’ 
their answers. They create an answer that is more detailed than most truth tellers are 
willing or able to give about their intentions. A similar ‘over-preparation’ effect was 
found in written truthful or deceptive statements about intentions (Kleinberg, van der 
Toolen, Vrij, Arntz, & Verschuere, 2018).  
What makes a question unexpected? Some expected questions can be made 
unexpected by adding a constraint (e.g. use reverse order or a fixed perspective; 
Lancaster et al. 2012). The downside of this approach is that these unexpected 
elements are known to be cognitively demanding independently of their 
unexpectedness. Some questions appear to be unexpected because they ask for 
information the interviewee did not expect the interviewer to want. Warmelink et al. 
(2012), Sooniste, Granhag, Knieps & Vrij, 2013, Clemens, Granhag & Strömwall 
(2013) and Mac Giolla and Granhag (2015) found that questions about the planning of 
an intention are unexpected for interviewees. Warmelink, et al. (2012) also found that 
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questions requesting details about the most salient aspect of the intention or about 
travel required for the intention are unexpected.  
Clemens, Granhag and Strömwall (2011) manipulated the order of questions 
about the intention and planning for the intention. They found that asking unexpected 
(planning) questions first increased the difference between truth tellers’ and liars’ 
within-statement consistency, compared to asking expected (intention) questions first. 
Asking unexpected questions first might disrupt liars’ strategies to be as convincing 
as possible and lead to better deception detection. Vrij et al. (2018) studied similar 
order effects in interpreter-mediated interviews that included questions about a trip 
(expected) and questions about the planning of a trip (unexpected). They found that 
the order of these questions did not affect the amount of detail provided. However, 
interpreter mediated interviews tend to elicit less detail, which may make detail 
effects harder to study (Ewens, Vrij, Leal, Mann, Jo & Fisher, 2016).    
Asking unexpected questions first may disrupt the interviewee’s mental 
representation of the interview. Fisher (1995) suggests that the order of the questions 
in an interview should be compatible with the interviewees’ mental representation of 
events. It is possible that it is not only the events discussed, but also the unfolding 
interview that needs to match the interviewee’s representation in order for the 
interview to be successful. If the unexpected-first order is more difficult for 
interviewees, this may reduce the amount of information elicited.  
In this article, we report two studies of participants being interviewed about 
the interviewee’s plans later that day (“their intention”). The two studies used the two 
main paradigms that are used to study detecting deception about intentions (Granhag 
& Mac Giolla, 2014). By using both paradigms, we can get a conceptual replication of 
the results and discuss differences between the two paradigms. In Study 1, 
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participants were interviewed about their own intentions, which they created 
independently of the study. In Study 2, the experimenter gave the participants an 
intention that they were told to complete after the interview. The interview questions, 
manipulations and hypotheses were the same in both studies.  
The interviews involved four types of questions about the participants’ 
intention: 1) general questions about the intention and its familiarity (‘general’); 2) 
details about the most salient event of the intention (‘core’); 3) how they would travel 
in order to reach the location for the intention (‘travel’) and 4) the planning they 
already completed or were intending to complete in order to ensure they’d be able to 
execute the intention (‘planning’). Following Warmelink et al. (2012), Clemens, 
Granhag and Strömwall (2013) and Mac Giolla and Granhag (2015), we expected that 
general questions would be most expected, then core and travel, with planning 
questions the least expected.   
We hypothesised that the expected-first order (general, core, travel, planning) 
would be less cognitively demanding than an unexpected-first order (planning, travel, 
core, general) and that this would be visible in several ways. Firstly, participants in 
the unexpected-first condition would experience the study as more difficult 
(Hypothesis 1). Secondly, participants in the unexpected-first condition should give 
fewer details, particularly perceptual and contextual details (Hypothesis 2). Thirdly, 
the extra cognitive load induced in the unexpected-first condition should affect liars 
more than truth tellers, due to the higher cognitive load associated with lying. 
Therefore, the difference in number of details between truth tellers and liars should be 
larger in the unexpected-first condition than in the expected-first condition 
(Hypothesis 3).  
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Study 1: Self-induced intentions  
Method.  
Participants. Eighty-five participants took part (61 women, 13 men, 11 non-
disclosed). Their mean age was 19.11 (SD = 2.70). All participants were students (62 
psychology majors, 16 psychology minors; 7 unknown). The study was conducted at 
X University, concurrently with the second study. Both were approved by the 
University Research Ethics Committee. Sample size for both studies were based on 
Warmelink et al. (2012).  
 
Design. The experiment had a 2 (Veracity, between: truth, lie) x 2 (Order, 
between: expected-first, unexpected-first) x 4 (Question type, within: general, core, 
travel, planning) mixed design. Participants were randomly allocated to the 
conditions. There were three main interviewers: authors Y (N = 15), Z (N = 44) and 
W (N = 15) and several emergency interviewers with less than 8 interviews each 
(collapsed into ‘other interviewers’).  
The dependent variables were question expectedness and difficulty  and level 
of detail provided (see Appendix A; all appendices are available on OSF 
[https://osf.io/93g7h/?view_only=680db3652bff44cfaa1b6534eb04688e).  
  
 Materials. The participants were recorded in an interview suite with wall 
mounted camera’s and a ceiling mounted microphone. A hand-held audio recorder 
was used as back-up.  
  
Procedure.   
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Pre-Interview Procedure. The participants signed up via an online participant 
pool (SONA). The study advertisement informed them that they would be interviewed 
about their intended activities immediately after they completed the study and that 
they might be asked to lie about these intentions during the study. Participants were 
emailed 1 to 3 days before the study. They were asked to provide information about 
their intentions and, for the liars, about the lie they were going to tell. When 
participants arrived at the lab they signed informed consent forms. Participants in both 
conditions were reminded that their task was to convince the interviewer they were 
telling the truth and asked to confirm that their intention had not changed since their 
initial email.  
Interview procedure. The participants were interviewed by an interviewer who 
was blind to their veracity. The interviewer was informed of their order condition, 
when the participant arrived. The interviewer asked the participants the interview 
questions (Appendix B; OSF), in either expected-first order or in unexpected-first 
order.  
Post-Interview procedure. Once the interview was completed, the interviewer 
rated the participants’ veracity and their confidence in this rating, while participants 
filled in a questionnaire about their experience of the interview. For purposes beyond 
the scope of this paper (see X, under review), participants then completed a reaction 
time task and a questionnaire about that task. The participants were then given a 
debriefing form and their SONA credits.  
 
Data Analysis for both studies  
Coding. The coding for both studies was done concurrently and using the 
same procedure. The interviews were transcribed by a transcription service. The 
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transcripts were coded (by author Y) and 33 transcripts (20%) were coded for 
reliability (author X). Both coders were blind to the Veracity condition of the 
transcript and the first coder was blind to the hypotheses of the experiment. After the 
first and the 15th transcript the coders discussed the coding and the correlation 
between the coders was checked; the coders clarified any differences between them.  
The coding scheme (Table 1) was similar to that used in Warmelink et al. 
(2012, 2013). These codes can be mapped onto the RM criteria (e.g. Nahari & Vrij, 
2013), ‘perceptual details’ and ‘contextual details’. Hedges are a detail type coded for 
in Warmelink et al. (2012, 2013), that do not map onto RM codes. They were added 
to the coding as the participants in these studies were speaking about future 
behaviour. Since future events are less certain than past events, they are often 
described with more hedges. The only difference with Warmelink et al. (2012, 2013) 
was that an extra type of detail (“knowledge”) was added at the coding stage, to 
capture some details that did not seem to fit any of the other categories.  
The reliability of the coding was measured using correlations and ICC on the 
numbers of details over the entire transcript (see Table 1). The highly variable nature 
of this data makes the commonly used Kappa statistic unsuitable (Vierra and Garrett, 
2005). All details except for Knowledge had correlations in the moderate or strong 
range. Due to the weak-to-moderate correlation, knowledge details were excluded 
from the remaining analyses, leaving 9 detail categories. The detail categories Visual, 
Auditory, Smell/Taste, Tactile and Action were then combined to form a perceptual 
details category. The Spatial and Temporal details were combined to form a 
contextual details category. Emotions were retained as separate category, in line with 
RM, as were the hedge details. A total details category was created by summing the 
perceptual, contextual and emotion details. Hedges were not included as they were 
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not considered a detail as such: they express uncertainty rather than provide 
information.  
Analyses. Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted with veracity and 
order as the independent/fixed factors and interviewer was added as a covariate. The 
interviewer covariate was included to control for any individual effect that the 
interviewer may have1. As results for the interviewer variable do not test any of our 
hypotheses, they are not reported.  
Pallai’s trace and Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported for the 
repeated measures ANOVA’s. To correct for the analysis of four different types of 
detail, the Bonferroni correction was applied, leading to an alpha of 0.01. Word count 
was not controlled for on any of the variables, as this tends to reduce content cues to 
deception (Elntib, Wagstaff, & Wheatcroft, 2015) and our hypotheses centre on the 
amount of detail not on detail density.  
Bayes factors were also calculated for all 1-df analyses. Bayes factors provide 
a continuous measure of evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the null 
hypothesis. We used the Dienes and Mclatchie (2018) R script (full code available in 
supplementary materials) to calculate Bayes factors. The prior model was specified 
using the half-normal distribution, setting the SD to the predicted effect size (Dienes, 
2014). In the absence of prior research on the order effect, we used the effect size for 
veracity from previous research (Warmelink, 2012; Warmelink et al., 2012) as an 
approximate scale of effect that details can be influenced by within an interview 
context.  We treat Bayes factors between 0.33 and 3 as weak evidence, while Bayes 
                                                 
1 There are significant interviewer by question type interaction effects for total details in both 
studies (self-induced: multivariate F (3,72) = 3.59, p = 0.02, ŋ2p = 0.13; other-induced: 
(multivariate F (3,74) = 7.88, p < 0.001, ŋ2p = 0.24. To test whether the inclusion of the covariate 
was affecting the results, the total details analysis was rerun without this covariate. There were 
no differences between the two analyses: all effects that were significant when interviewer was 
included were significant when it wasn’t. The same was true for non-significant effects. 
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factors in the ranges 0.05-0.33 and 3-20 are moderate for the null and experimental 
hypothesis respectively, and Bayes factors <0.05 and above 20 are strong evidence for 
the null and experimental hypothesis respectively (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014).  
 
Results. 
Question expectedness. The ANOVA showed a main effect of question type 
(F (3, 72) = 25.09, p < 0.001, ŋ2p = 0.51). No other significant main or interaction 
effects were found (all Fs < 3.08, all ps > 0.03). The expectedness ratings matched the 
hypothesis, with general question considered the most expected, then core, then 
travel, and planning was the least expected question type (see Table 2).  
There was a significant main effect of question type on the total number of 
details reported, F (3, 72) = 17.24, p < 0.001, ŋ2p = 0.42. Participants gave the most 
details in response to travel questions, followed by the core questions, then the most 
expected general question, with the planning questions eliciting the least details. 
There was no significant interaction effect between question type and veracity, F (3, 
72) = 1.66, p = 0.18, ŋ2p = 0.07. 
Difficulty. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of question type (F 
(2.84, 222) = 4.28, p = 0.01, ŋ2p = 0.06). Planning questions were rated as the most 
difficult, followed by core questions; both were experienced as significantly more 
difficult than the travel questions and general questions (see Table 2). There were no 
other significant effects (all Fs < 1.74, all ps > 0.17).  
Detail. The ANOVAs showed no significant main effects of order or order by 
question type interaction effects (all Fs < 3.29, all ps >0.03). However, the Bayes 
factors indicated that for total details there was moderate evidence, BH(0, 37.83) = 3.58, 
that participants gave more detail in the expected first condition (M = 160.28, SD = 
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78.08) than in the unexpected-first condition (M = 131.58, SD = 53.52), F (1,74) = 
3.75, p = 0.06, ŋ2p = 0.05. The Bayes factor also provided moderate evidence, BH(0, 
7.05) = 3.64, that participants gave more contextual detail in the expected first 
condition (M = 44.55, SD = 26.42) than in the unexpected-first condition (M = 35.14, 
SD = 17.03), F (1,77) = 3.62, p = 0.06, ŋ2p = 0.05. The Bayes factors provided weak, 
inconclusive support for the experimental hypothesis for perceptual, emotion and 
hedge main effects (see tables 3 and 4 for full results).  
Lie detection cues. None of the details showed a three-way effect between 
veracity, order and question type (all Fs < 1.86, all ps > 0.15) or a veracity by 
question order effect (all Fs < 3.71, all ps > 0.06). The Bayes factors show weak, 
inconclusive evidence for the experimental hypothesis for total (BH(0, 37.83) = 1.13), 
perceptual, contextual, emotion, and hedge details (full results in Table 3 and 4). 
Further research is required in order to determine whether question order increases the 
difference between truth tellers and liars in the amount of information provided.  
 
Study 2: Other-induced intentions study 
Method.  
Participants. Eighty-four participants were recruited (61 women, 18 men, 5 
non-disclosed; mean age = 19.18 (1.93)). All were students (62 psychology majors, 
13 psychology minors and 9 unspecified students). This study was run concurrently 
with study 1. No participants took part in both studies.  
Materials. The same materials as in the self-induced study were used. 
Additionally, participants in this study were asked to complete a questionnaire asking 
them to rate the strength of the intention to execute the experimental task (Appendix 
C; OSF). 
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Design. The design was the same as for Study 1. Authors Y (N = 27), Z (N = 
26) and W (N = 27) completed the majority of the interviews, 4 were completed by 
one of the other interviewers.  
Procedure. 
Pre-Interview Procedure. Participants signed up via the online participant 
pool and received their instructions after signing the informed consent form in the lab. 
Truth tellers were instructed to complete an intention (to buy two items from a shop) 
and to tell the truth about this intentions during the interview. The liars were given 
their intention (to drop off a USB-stick) and were told that in the interview they 
should lie about their intention and pretend that they had the truth teller’s intention, 
for which they received the same instructions as the truth tellers. Participants in both 
veracity conditions were given 8 minutes to “prepare or plan” for completing their 
intention and for the interview. They were given the opportunity for more time to 
prepare (only one participant did).  
Interview Procedure. Same as the Self-induced study. 
Post-interview procedure. After the participants completed the questionnaire 
and the unreported reaction time task, they were informed they would not have to 
execute their intentions. The participants were given the opportunity to ask the 
experimenter questions about the deception that the experimenter had perpetrated. 
They were reminded that they could withdraw their data if they wished (no one 
withdrew). They were then asked to complete a questionnaire on whether they had 
believed that they had to execute the intention and how they prepared for this (see 
Appendix C; OSF). The participants received a debriefing form and their credit for 
the SONA participant pool.   
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 Data analysis. See data analysis for the self-induced study.  
 
Results.  
Induced Intention manipulation check. Participants indicated that they were 
convinced that they would have to complete the intention (M = 5.99, SD = 1.14, out of 
7) and that they were motivated to do so (M = 5.60, SD = 0.94, out of 7). This did not 
differ significantly across different conditions (all Fs < 2.74, all ps > 0.12).   
Question expectedness. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
question type, F (2.73, 231) = 5.58, p = 0.001, ŋ2p = 0.07. As hypothesised, the 
general questions were rated as most expected, core, travel and planning questions 
were all expected less. Core, travel and planning questions did not differ significantly 
from each other (see Table 5). No other significant main or interaction effects were 
found (all Fs < 1.06, all ps > 0.36). 
There was a significant main effect of question type on total details reported, 
F (3, 72) = 40.41, p < 0.001, ŋ2p = 0.63. Participants gave the most details in response 
to travel questions, followed by the core questions, then the general question, with the 
planning questions eliciting the least details. This pattern matches Study one (see 
Table 5). There was no significant interaction effect between question type and 
veracity, F (3, 72) = 0.31, p = 0.82, ŋ2p = 0.01. 
Difficulty. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of veracity, F (1, 
76) = 19.84, p < 0.001, ŋ2p = 0.21. This interacted with question type, F (2.89, 228) = 
4.73, p = 0.003, ŋ2p = 0.06. For all question types, except travel, the liars rated the 
questions as more difficult than truth tellers. However, there was no effect of question 
order, F(1, 76) = 2.47, p = 0.12, ŋ2p = 0.03, nor did veracity and question order 
interact, F (1, 76) = 1.65, p = .20, ŋ2p = 0.02. 
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Detail. The ANOVAs showed no significant question order main effects or 
order by question type interaction effects (All Fs < 6.53, all ps > 0.01) at the corrected 
alpha level of 0.01. The Bayes factors provided weak evidence for the null hypothesis 
for total, perceptual, contextual and emotion details, and moderate evidence for the 
null hypothesis for hedge details, BH(0, 1.58) = 0.21, (see Tables 6 and 7).  
Lie detection cues. None of the details showed a three-way effect between 
veracity, order and question type (all Fs < 1.85, all ps > 0.15). No veracity by 
question order effects were found for any of the details (all Fs < 077, all ps > 0.38). 
Bayes factors showed weak evidence for the null hypothesis for all detail types except 
for emotion details, which showed weak evidence for the experimental hypothesis 
(see Tables 6 and 7).  
 
Both studies combined. 
Overall, the mean length of the interview was 5 minutes and 59 seconds (SD = 
1.51). There was a high correlation between the total number of details and the length 
of the interviews (r = 0.69, p < 0.001). 
When combining the two datasets, the null results remain. For total details, 
there was no three-way effect between veracity, order and question type (F (2.56, 
397.40 = 0.15, p = 0.90); nor were there any significant two-way effects (all Fs <2.49, 
all ps > 0.07), except for a question type by interviewer effect (F (2.56, 397.40)= 
13.34, p < 0.001, ŋ2p = 0.08). No significant main effects were found either (all Fs 
<2.53, all ps > 0.11), except for a significant main effect of Questions type (F (3, 
397.40)= 63.34, p < 0.001, ŋ2p = 0.29). Participants gave the most details in response 
to travel questions (M = 54.08, SE = 2.28, CI [49.58-58.58]), followed by the core 
questions (M = 38.86, SE = 1.90, CI [25.114-42.60]), then the most expected general 
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question (M = 29.25, SE = 1.33, CI [26.63-31.87]), with the planning questions 
eliciting the lowest number of details (M = 21.26, SE = 1.04, CI [19.21-23.32]). The 
Bayes factor for total details showed weak evidence for the experimental hypothesis 
for the order main effect, BH(0, 37.83) = 1.56, and weak evidence for the null hypothesis 
for the order by veracity interaction, BH(0, 37.83) = 0.60) 
 
Discussion  
In both studies the expectedness of the questions was similar to that reported 
in Warmelink et al. (2012) and Sooniste, et al. (2013). General questions were the 
most expected, with core, travel and planning questions were less expected. Although 
the difference between core, travel and planning questions was not consistently 
significant, the replication of high expectedness of general questions and low 
expectedness of planning questions suggests that question expectedness is relatively 
consistent across samples. However, despite the geographical variation in the samples 
in the literature (Warmelink et al., 2012 and Sooniste, et al., 2013 were run in 
different countries), they have similar demographics (i.e. WEIRD; Henrich, Heine 
and Norenzayan, 2010). Whether question expectedness results would be robust 
across cultures is uncertain.    
The results also show that question expectedness is not the only driver of 
difficulty and the level of detail provided. The expectedness, difficulty and the level 
of detail provided were not directly related to each other, as may have been expected. 
Core and travel questions elicit large numbers of details, although they are moderately 
expected and core questions are considered difficult. Presumably these questions, 
which explicitly ask for detail about the intention itself, are perceived as difficult, but 
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also lend themselves to a large number of details being given, independently of their 
unexpectedness.  
The studies do not replicate previously reported findings that there is an 
interaction between question type and veracity, with truth tellers giving more detail 
than liars to unexpected questions, but not for expected questions (Warmelink et al., 
2012; Sooniste et al., 2013). In both current studies, no such effect was found. It is 
notable that this interaction is also not found in Vrij et al. (2018). Why this effect 
from the 2012 and 2013 studies does not replicate to these newer studies is unclear. 
Further replications should be conducted in order to draw conclusions about the 
existence and size of the effect. Although a significant question type by veracity 
effect is not necessary to answer our hypotheses about the order of the questions, it 
may indicate that this dataset differs in some unknown way from the previous studies 
(Warmelink et al., 2012; Sooniste et al., 2013).  
Hypothesis 1 was not supported. In neither study did the order of expected and 
unexpected questions significantly affect the perceived difficulty of the questions. 
However, in both studies the questions were perceived to differ in difficulty, although 
this was not consistent across the studies. In the self-induced study, planning 
questions were considered the most difficult, while in the other-induced study core 
questions were. This is perhaps related to the source of the intention: self-induced 
intentions may be more salient, especially for details about the intention itself, while 
the core details of an other-induced may be harder to imagine and describe. The 
planning for the other-induced intentions was completed shortly before the interview, 
while in the self-induced condition the planning may have been done some time ago, 
making it harder for the participants to remember.  
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That question difficulty was not influenced by question order could indicate 
that asking unexpected questions first does not increase cognitive load. Alternatively, 
asking participants to rate each question - rather than the whole interview – may not 
be not the best way to detect cognitive load effects of question order. This may lead 
the participants to focus on the relative differences between the questions.  
Hypothesis 2 was only partly supported. For self-induced intentions, 
participants in the expected-first order provided more details overall than those in the 
unexpected first order, although this was not significant and Bayes factors indicated 
that the data provided only moderate evidence for this hypothesis. This finding was 
not replicated in the other-induced study, nor was this effect present in the analysis 
that combined the data from both studies. It may be that this order effect is only 
present when people are discussing certain topics. Self-induced intentions may be 
more salient to participants than other-induced intentions, which may have influenced 
the order effect. This result does indicate that the two paradigms used to study 
deception about intentions in the literature may not be fully equivalent. Larger effects 
may be present in paradigms that use self-induced intentions rather than other-induced 
ones.    
Hypothesis 3 was not supported: asking questions in the unexpected-first order 
did not increase the differences between truth tellers and liars. The results are in line 
with previous findings that the order of expected and unexpected questions has little 
or no influence on the amount of information given in an interview (Vrij et al. 2018) 
and contrast with studies that suggested that asking unexpected question increases lie 
detection accuracy (Clemens, Granhag and Strömwall, 2011). It is possible that order 
only affects consistency-based lie detection cues and not detail-based ones.  
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The current studies have several limitations. One issue is whether the studies 
were sufficiently powered. The studies provide moderate evidence for total details in 
Study 1, but in Study 2 Bayes factors provided only weak support for either 
hypothesis. Again, this points to the possibility that the paradigm used to induce the 
intention is influencing effects sizes. This underpowering was also influenced by an a 
priori overestimation of the size of the interaction between veracity and the 
expectedness of a question, which was based on previous studies (e.g. Warmelink et 
al., 2012; Sooniste et al., 2013), but was found to be not significant in these studies. 
Future research can use these results to conduct more accurate a priori power 
analyses.  
A second limitation is that the Bayes factors require the plausibility of 
different effect sizes (a “prior model”) to be specified. We specified the prior models 
using the size of the veracity effect in a study that used a very similar interview and 
coding protocol. While this provided an idea of how much psychological factors can 
be affected within an interview context, we ideally would have specified the priors 
based on previous studies of the order effect. Unfortunately these were not available 
to us, and we hope future research into order effects builds on the results that we have 
reported here.       
In conclusion, the results show that participants in the unexpected-first 
condition do not consistently differ from participants in the expected-first condition. 
Most importantly, the unexpected-first order does not increase the differences 
between liars and truth tellers in a way that benefits lie detection. This suggests that 
researchers and practitioners who are using unexpected questions for eliciting detail 
may use them at any point in the interview without detriment.  
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Table 1 
Coding Information and Reliability per Detail  




Visual1 Details that are seen The grey staircase 
(2 Visual details) 
.89* .93 
(.86-.97) 




Smell/taste1 Details that are smelt 
or tasted 
It smells of chips .75* .86 
(.71-93) 
Tactile1 Details that are felt It’s cold .80* .83 
(.66-.92) 
Action1 Details about the 
participants’ actions 
I’ll walk there .94* .96 
(.92-.98) 
Spatial2 Details about spatial 
arrangements 
Next to the store .92* .87 
(.73-.93) 
Temporal2 Details about 
temporal order 

















I have to spend as 





Note. * indicates p < .01. 1 indicates perceptual details. 2 indicates contextual details.  
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Mean (SE), CI  
Difficulty 
Mean (SE), CI 
Number of details 
Mean (SE), CI 
General 8.47 (0.28),  
CI [8.17-9.30] 
5.82 (0.31),  
CI [5.21-6.43] 
30.26 (2.14),  
CI [25.99-34.54] 
Core 7.07 (0.30),  
CI [6.47-7.67] 
6.92 (0.32), 
 CI [6.28-7.56]) 
41.02 (3.06),  
CI [34.92-47.12] 
Travel 6.55 (0.29),  
CI [5.98-7.11] 
6.05 (0.29),  
CI [5.46-6.62] 
52.99 (3.52),  
CI [45.97-60.01] 
Planning 5.80 (0.33), CI 
[5.14-6.46] 
7.48 (0.37),  
CI [6.75-8.22] 




Estimated marginal means, standard errors and 95 % confidence intervals for 
total details in study 1: self-induced  
Veracity Order 
Question 
type Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
     
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
Truth 
Expected-
first General 28.93 4.28 20.40 37.46 
  Core 34.28 6.11 22.10 46.45 
  Travel 51.58 7.03 37.56 65.59 
  Planning 24.32 3.24 17.86 30.78 
 
Unexpected-
first General 28.51 4.16 20.23 36.79 
  Core 32.12 5.93 20.30 43.94 
  Travel 43.10 6.83 29.50 56.70 
  Planning 18.40 3.15 12.13 24.67 
Lie 
Expected-
first General 30.06 4.40 21.28 38.83 
  Core 56.09 6.29 43.57 68.62 
  Travel 69.95 7.23 55.54 84.37 
  Planning 26.27 3.34 19.63 32.92 
 
Unexpected-
first General 33.56 4.37 24.85 42.27 
  Core 41.58 6.24 29.15 54.02 
  Travel 47.33 7.18 33.02 61.64 
  Planning 19.74 3.31 13.14 26.33 
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Table 4 
P-values and Bayes factors (Mean of theory, SD of theory) for all details in 












Bayes factor  
Order by Veracity 
effect 
Total 0.06 BH(0, 37.83) = 3.58 0.44 BH(0, 37.83) = 1.13 
Perceptual 0.11 BH(0, 13.59) = 2.46 0.52 BH(0, 13.59) = 1.14 
Contextual 0.06 BH(0, 7.05) = 3.64 0.60 BH(0, 7.05) = 1.09 
Emotion 0.78 BH(0, 0.19) = 1.07 0.35 BH(0, 0.19) = 1.05 
Hedge 0.22 BH(0, 1.58) = 1.43 0.06 BH(0, 1.58) = 2.15 
 
Table 5  
Expectedness, Difficulty and detail per question type for study 2: other-




Mean (SE), [CI]  
Difficulty 
 Mean (SE), [CI] 
Number of details 
Mean (SE), [CI] 
General 7.48 (0.30),  
CI [6.88-8.08] 
6.41 (0.24),  
CI [5.93-6.89] 
28.35 (1.63), CI 
[25.10-31.59] 




37.17 (2.24), CI  
[32.70-41.64] 




55.47 (2.85), CI 
[49.80-61.15] 
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Table 6  
Estimated marginal means, standard errors and 95 % confidence intervals for 
total details in study 2: other-induced 
Veracity Order 
Question 
type Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
     
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
Truth 
Expected-
first General 26.15 3.46 19.25 33.05 
  Core 39.73 4.77 30.22 49.23 
  Travel 58.95 6.07 46.87 71.02 
  Planning 21.63 2.81 16.04 27.21 
 
Unexpected-
first General 32.51 3.28 25.98 39.03 
  Core 34.26 4.52 25.26 43.25 
  Travel 51.65 5.74 40.22 63.08 
  Planning 19.63 2.66 14.35 24.92 
Lie 
Expected-
first General 28.00 3.12 21.79 34.21 
  Core 38.19 4.30 29.63 46.76 
  Travel 53.82 5.46 42.94 64.70 
  Planning 19.62 2.53 14.59 24.65 
 
Unexpected-
first General 26.72 3.19 20.37 33.08 
  Core 36.51 4.40 27.75 45.26 
  Travel 57.48 5.59 46.35 68.60 




P-values and Bayes factors (Mean of theory, SD of theory) for all details in 











Bayes factor  
Order by Veracity 
effect 
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Total 0.06 BH(0, 37.83) = 0.36 0.44 BH(0, 37.83) = 0.49 
Perceptual 0.77 BH(0, 13.59) = 0.66 0.67 BH(0, 13.59) = 0.74 
Contextual 0.96 BH(0, 7.05) = 0.44 0.69 BH(0, 7.05) = 0.59 
Emotion 0.28 BH(0, 0.19) = 0.60 0.38 BH(0, 0.19) = 1.29 
Hedges 0.01 BH(0, 1.58) = 0.21 0.42 BH(0, 1.58) = 0.52 
 
 
